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Abstract
This Article focuses on recent developments in European multi-jurisdictional practice rights
that have major implications for the control of entry to the legal professions and some of the
related deontological rules that govern access to professional legal life across the European Union
(”EU”) and the European Economic Area (”EEA”). Additionally, it looks at their impact on rules
regulating the competence of lawyers and admission to the legal professions, primarily in Europe,
but with some reference to the position in the United States as well.
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ASSESSING THE EUROPEAN MARKET FOR 
LEGAL SERVICES: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FREE 
MOVEMENT OF LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
Julian Lonbay* 
INTRODUCTION 
Lord Slynn played an instrumental role in developing the 
case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“Court”) 
on the free movement of lawyers, most notably in the Vlassopoulou 
case,1 among others. The growth of international legal practice 
has been widely recognized,2 as have the related ethical dilemmas 
thrown up by such trans-border practice.3 There is no need for 
lawyers within the European Economic Area (“EEA”)4 to “sneak 
 
* Senior Lecturer in Law, Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham 
(U.K.). The views expressed in this Article are the author’s alone. 
1. Vlassopoulou v. Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- und Europaangelegenheiten 
Baden-Württemberg, Case C-340/89, [1991] E.C.R. I-2357. 
2. See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF 
PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMICS AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN STATES 
(2002); Richard L. Abel, Transnational Law Practice, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 737 (1994); 
John Flood, Megalawyering in the Global Order: The Cultural, Social and Economic 
Transformation of Global Legal Practice, 3 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 169 (1996); Jonathan D. 
Greenberg, Does Power Trump Law?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1789 (2003); Laurel S. Terry et al., 
Transnational Legal Practice 42 INT’L LAW. 833 (2008); David M. Trubek et al., Global 
Restructuring and the Law; Studies of Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of 
Transnational Arenas, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407 (1994). 
3. See Bernard L. Greer, Jr., Professional Regulation and Globalization: Towards a Better 
Balance, in GLOBAL LAW IN PRACTICE 169, 169–84 (1997). See generally LAW WITHOUT 
FRONTIERS: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS APPLICABLE 
TO THE CROSS-BORDER PRACTICE OF LAW (Edwin Godfrey ed., 1995); Owen Bonheimer 
& Paul Supple, Unauthorized Practice of Law by U.S. Lawyers in U.S.-Mexico Practice, 15 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 697 (2002); Julian Lonbay, Lawyer Ethics in the Twenty-First Century: The 
Global Practice Reconciling Regulatory and Deontological Differences—The European Experience, 
34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 907 (2001); Detlev F. Vagts, Professional Responsibility in 
Transborder Practice: Conflict and Resolution, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677 (2000); 
Christopher J. Whelan, Ethics Beyond the Horizon: Why Regulate the Global Practice of Law?, 
34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 931 (2001). 
4. The European Economic Area (“EEA”) consists of all the Member States of the 
European Union (“EU”), together with Iceland, Leichtenstein, and Norway which have 
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around” in order to practice in multiple jurisdictions, as U.S. 
lawyers must do for the most part.5 Entry controls to the various 
bars in the United States were mostly established after the First 
World War with little regard for the impact that they would have 
on multi-jurisdictional U.S. practice or the multi-national 
authorized legal practice rules.6 This issue is currently under 
review by the American Bar Association (“ABA”) and U.S. state 
bar associations.7 
In the EEA, as in the United States, the trend towards larger 
law firms is evident, particularly in Germany, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom.8 The resulting increase in lawyer 
 
accepted essentially all of the EU legislation and rules governing transnational legal 
practice. 
5. Consider, for comparison, the relatively low level of permissible 
multijurisdictional practice in the United States, which many observers regret. See 
Samuel J. Brakel & Wallace D. Loh, Regulating the Multistate Practice of Law, 50 WASH. L. 
REV. 699 (1975); Ronald A. Brand, Uni-State Lawyers and Multinational Practice: Dealing 
with International, Transnational, and Foreign Law, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1135 
(2001); Peter S. Margulies, Protecting the Public Without Protectionism: Access, Competence 
and Pro Hac Vice Admission to the Practice of Law, 7 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 285 (2002); 
John F. Sutton, Jr., Unauthorized Practice of Law by Lawyers: A Post Seminar Reflection on 
“Ethics and the Multijurisdictional Practice of Law,” 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 1027 (1995); Laurel S. 
Terry, An Introduction to the European Community’s Legal Ethics Code, 7 GEO. J. OF LEGAL 
ETHICS 1 (1993); Vagts, supra note 3; Charles W. Wolfram, Sneaking Around in the Legal 
Profession: Interjurisdictional Unauthorized Practice by Transactional Lawyers, 36 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 665 (1995); AMER. BAR ASSOC. [ABA], REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON 
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/
final_mjp_rpt_5-17.pdf. 
6. Gerard J. Clark, The Two Faces of Multi-Jurisdictional Practice, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 251, 
251, 254 (2002). 
7. See ABA, CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/rule-adoption.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2010). U.S. states are increasingly adopting 
more liberal rules. See John Haltaway, ABA, Multijurisdictional Practice, 
http://www.abanet.org/barserv/issuesupdate/mjp.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2010). 
8. See, e.g., Trubek et al., supra note 2, at 435–36. In fact, the EU legislation and 
policies discussed in this Article apply not only to all twenty-nine Member States, but also 
to Iceland, Leichtenstein, and Norway, by virtue of their membership in the EEA, closely 
linked to the EU by the EEA Treaty. See Agreement on the European Economic Area, 
1994 O.J. L 1/3. In addition, Switzerland has a number of specific bilateral 
arrangements with the EU. See e.g., Cooperation Agreement to Combat Fraud and Any 
Other Illegal Activity to the Detriment of Their Financial Interests, EC-Switz., Oct. 26, 
2004, 2009 O.J. L 46/8; Agreement on the Swiss Confederation’s Association with 
Implementation, Application and Development of the Schengen Acquis, EC-Switz., Oct. 
26, 2004, 2008 O.J. L 53/52; Agreement Concerning the Criteria and Mechanisms for 
Establishing the State Responsible for Examining a Request for Asylum Lodged in a 
Member State or in Switzerland, EC-Switz., Oct. 26, 2004, 2008 O.J. L 53/5; Agreement 
Concerning the Participation of Switzerland in the European Environment Agency and 
the European Environment Information and Observation Network, EC-Switz., Oct. 26, 
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specialization9 has increased the stratification of the legal 
professions, and is leading commentators to consider that “elite” 
lawyers may not identify so readily with the general legal 
profession, as much as with other specialists and perhaps other 
professions, too.10 In England and Wales, the educational effects 
of this tendency are becoming apparent in the bespoke legal 
practice courses run for the benefit of larger law firms. This 
tendency is likely to become more pronounced as the barriers to 
increased inter-disciplinary practice decrease at the national 
level. The Clementi-based reform in England and Wales11 and 
the Legal Services Act of 2007,12 currently being implemented by 
the new Legal Services Board, will allow multi-disciplinary 
practice in England and Wales in the form of alternate business 
structures. This is primarily advanced by the view that the 
“marketplace” wants to receive legal advice as part of a general 
business package.13 As the monopoly rights of legal professions 
 
2004, 2006 O.J. L 90/37; Agreement in the Audiovisual Field, Establishing the Terms 
and Conditions for the Participation of the Swiss Confederation in the Community 
Programmes MEDIA Plus and MEDIA Training, EC-Switz., Oct. 26, 2004, 2006 O.J. L 
90/23; Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Statistics, EC-Switz., Oct. 26, 2004, 
2006 O.J. L 90/2; Agreement Amending the Agreement Between the European 
Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation of 22 July 1972 as Regards the 
Provisions Applicable to Processed Agricultural Products, EC-Switz., Oct. 26, 2004, 2005 
O.J. L 23/19; Agreement Providing for Measures Equivalent to Those Laid Down in 
Council Directive 2003/48/EC on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest 
Payments, EC-Switz., Oct. 26, 2004, 2004 O.J. L 385/30; Council & Commission Decision 
as Regards the Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation, on the 
Conclusion of Seven Agreements with the Swiss Confederation, No. 2002/309, 2002 O.J. 
L 114/1 (attaching seven bilateral agreements concluded with Switzerland in 1999 
commonly referred to as the “bilateral I” package); Agreement Between the European 
Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation, July 22, 1972, 1972 O.J. L 300/189 
(establishing a free trade agreement). See generally MARIUS VAHL & NINA GROLIMUND, 
INTEGRATION WITHOUT MEMBERSHIP: SWITZERLAND’S BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH THE 
EU (2006). 
9. See David Sugarman & Avrom Sherr, Globalisation and Legal Education, 8 INT’L J. 
LEGAL PROF. 5 (2001). 
10. See Mary C. Daly, The Structure of Legal Education and the Legal Profession, Multi-
Disciplinary Practice, Competition, and Globalization, 52. J. LEGAL EDUC. 480, 482 (2002) 
(commenting on the position in the Unites States). 
11. See SIR DAVID CLEMENTI, REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL 
SERVICES IN ENGLAND AND WALES: FINAL PAPER (Dec. 2004), available at 
http://www.legal-services-review.org.uk/content/report/report-chap.pdf. 
12. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29 (U.K.). 
13. See CLEMENTI, supra note 11, at 5–6; Daly, supra note 10, at 485–86. 
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diminish with national regulatory reform,14 pushed a little by the 
impulsion of EU law, the increasing de facto specialization of 
parts of the legal professions will increase pressure on entry 
regimes to permit ultra-specialized and experienced practitioners 
access to the growing market for such services. Such access to a 
host state market might be allowed without the full local 
regulatory requirement of broad-based knowledge of the host 
state’s law. EU law has permitted temporary practice under a 
lawyer’s home state title since the 1970s15 and the more recent 
Establishment Directive16 allows those with relatively minimal 
knowledge of local rules to gain access to the host state legal 
market and the host state legal profession, even with little pre-
controlled assessment of their local legal knowledge. 
This Article focuses on recent developments in European 
multi-jurisdictional practice rights that have major implications 
for the control of entry to the legal professions and some of the 
related deontological rules that govern access to professional 
legal life across the EU and the EEA. Additionally, it looks at 
their impact on rules regulating the competence of lawyers and 
admission to the legal professions, primarily in Europe, but with 
some reference to the position in the United States as well. 
I. INTERFACE OF ENTRY CONTROLS AND UNION LAW 
A. Competence of Lawyers and Entry Controls 
The question of competence to enter the legal profession is 
fundamentally an ethical issue.17 Lawyers should be competent,18 
 
14. See LA COMMISSION PRESIDEE PAR JEAN-MICHEL DARROIS, RAPPORT SUR LES 
PROFESSIONS DU DROIT [REPORT ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION] (2009) (Fr.), available at 
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/rap_com_darrois_20090408.pdf. 
15. See Council Directive No. 77/249/EEC to Facilitate the Effective Exercise by 
Lawyers of Freedom to Provide Services, 1977 O.J. L 78/17 [hereinafter Lawyers’ 
Services Directive]. 
16. See Parliament & Council Directive No. 98/5 to Facilitate Practice of the 
Profession of Lawyer on a Permanent Basis in a Member State Other than that in which 
the Qualification Was Obtained, 1998 O.J. L 77/36 [hereinafter Establishment 
Directive]. 
17. See generally RIGHTS, LIABILITY, AND ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE 
(Mary C. Daly & Roger J. Goebel eds., 2d ed. 1994). 
18. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2010) (“A lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client.”); Council of Bars & Law Societies of Europe 
[CCBE], CODE OF CONDUCT FOR EUROPEAN LAWYERS § 3.1.3 (2008) [hereinafter CCBE 
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especially in societies where they have reserved rights and 
privileges.19 Competence is considered a core attribute or value 
of lawyers.20 The Council of Europe’s Recommendation on the 
Freedom of Exercise of the Profession of Lawyers, adopted in 
2000, strongly supports the independence of lawyers as necessary 
in a free society that upholds the rule of law.21 Principle 1 
emphasizes that access to the profession should be controlled by 
independent authorities.22 Under principle 3, lawyers also have a 
duty to act “diligently.”23 
Entry controls essentially govern the initial competence of 
lawyers.24 Such entry regulations can be considered “necessary 
for the proper practice of the legal profession.”25 The regulatory 
 
CODE OF CONDUCT] (mandating that all lawyers “shall not handle a matter which the 
lawyer knows or ought to know he or she is not competent to handle, without 
cooperating with a lawyer who is competent to handle it” and “shall not accept 
instructions unless he or she can discharge those instructions promptly having regard to 
the pressure of other work”); INT’L BAR ASSOC. [IBA], DRAFT CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT FOR COUNSEL BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT art. 5(1)(a) 
(2003), available at http://www.ibanet.org/document/
default.aspx?documentuid=6f13da33-4c27-47d0-9cba-ad1e3a7dc324 (declaring that 
counsel is obligated to “act with competence”). 
19. These are usually expressed as a monopoly on providing legal advice, often 
including special rights of audience in courts and special privileges in relation to 
communications with clients. 
20. See ABA COMM’N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES (2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/
mdpfinalrep2000.html (“It is undeniable that competence is a core value of the legal 
profession.”); CCBE, Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession, princ. (g) 
(Nov. 25, 2006), available at http://www.ccbe.org/fileadmin/user_upload/
NTCdocument/EN_Code_of_conductp1_1249308118.pdf (listing “professional 
competence” as a “core principal”); IBA SECTION ON BUSINESS LAW, TASK FORCE ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL PRACTICE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TEMPORARY CROSS-
BORDER COMMERCIAL PRACTICE 16 n.18 (2004). 
21. Council of Europe Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member 
States on the Freedom of Exercise of the Profession of Lawyer, No. R(2000)21 (Oct. 25 
2000). 
22. Id. at 3. 
23. Id. at 4. 
24. Entry controls are one of the signs of a self-regulating profession, “professional 
knowledge” being “the key” to market control and self-regulation. ANDREW BOON & 
JENNIFER LEVIN, THE ETHICS AND CONDUCT OF LAWYERS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 42 (1st 
ed. 1999). Somewhat in contrast, Dezalay considers knowledge as part of the 
battleground between lawyers and other market suppliers. Yver Dezaley, Turf Battles and 
Tribal Disputes, 54 MOD. L. REV. 792 (1991). 
25. See Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, Case 
C-309/99, [2002] E.C.R. I-1577, ¶ 110. But see David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate 
Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 812 (1992). 
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authority for solicitors in England and Wales is considering 
whether competence should not be checked more directly after 
admission as well.26 Other arguments for entry control include 
the promotion of more efficient court and dispute resolution 
processes.27 In the U.S. context, Barton argues that “rising entry 
standards have multiple benefits to lawyers,” but with little 
evidence that the resulting increased costs for consumers are 
justified.28 
B. Entry Controls and Competition Law 
From a competition law point of view, the asymmetry of 
information between lawyers and average consumers of legal 
services (the average consumer is not in a position to judge the 
competence of lawyers) can be used to justify professional entry 
controls as a restraint on trade, allowing for the protection of the 
ill-informed consumer.29 The European Commission issued a 
White Paper on Competition and Professional Services, and 
published an independent Austrian study on legal services, which 
was critical of many European bars.30 Particularly in view of the 
 
26. Neil Rose, Lawyers Face Prospect of Competence Checks, LAW SOC’Y GAZETTE, July 
27, 2006, at 1. 
27. See Luxembourg v. European Parliament, Case C-168/98 [2000] E.C.R. I-9131, 
¶ 30 (“According to the case-law of the Court, the application of professional rules to 
lawyers, in particular those relating to organisation, qualifications, professional ethics, 
supervision and liability, provides ultimate consumers of legal services and the sound 
administration of justice with the necessary guarantees of integrity and experience.” 
(citing Reisebüro Broede v. Sandker, Case C-3/95 [1996], E.C.R. 6511, ¶ 38)). 
28. Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should 
Control Regulation—Courts, the Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1190, 
(2003); see also Daniel R. Hansen, Do We Need the Bar Examination? A Critical Evaluation of 
the Justifications for the Bar Exam and Proposed Alternatives, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1191 
(1995). 
29. RICHARD ABEL, ENGLISH LAWYERS BETWEEN MARKET AND STATE 96–120, (2003); 
Benjamin H. Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers? An Economic Analysis of Justifications for 
Entry and Conduct Regulations, 83 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 429, 437 (2001). Barton finds the 
consumer protection argument to be unpersuasive in the United States, but notes the 
context of the advice and representation monopoly that exists there for lawyers. Id. at 
437. 
30. Commission of the European Communities, Report on Competition in 
Professional Services, COM (2004) 83 Final (Feb. 2004) [hereinafter White Paper on 
Competition & Professional Services]; IAIN PATERSON ET AL., INSTITUT FÜR HÖHERE 
STUDIEN [INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES], ECONOMIC IMPACT OF REGULATION IN 
THE FIELD OF LIBERAL PROFESSIONS IN DIFFERENT MEMBER STATES: REGULATION OF 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 43–50 (2003), available at http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/
lib/eb1-i.pdf (research study performed for the Directorate General for Competition of 
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EU’s competition rules, the Commission’s White Paper describes 
entry requirements for lawyers as possibly being overly restrictive 
and unnecessary.31 The Commission report and Austrian study, 
which the Commission funded, indicated that many of the 
monopolies that lawyers have, which vary in different European 
states, are excessive and unnecessary. Many of those services 
could be done better and more cheaply by other people, and the 
examples tended to come from the more liberal states where 
monopolies are being diminished or disbanded.32 The European 
Commission is essentially arguing that if this reform can be 
achieved in certain Member States, such as England or Sweden, 
then it should likewise be possible in other Member States, such 
as France or Germany, or even a state with a high level of 
restraint, such as Greece. Given the modern, decentralized 
nature of EU competition law enforcement, the Commission has 
encouraged national competition authorities to investigate and 
follow the path the Commission set up and implement 
competition law at the national level with respect to legal 
services.33 Such inquiries were instigated in Denmark,34 Ireland,35 
 
the European Commission); see also CCBE, RECOMMENDATION ON TRAINING OUTCOMES 
FOR EUROPEAN LAWYERS (2007), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_ 
upload/NTCdocument/EN_Training_Outcomes1_1196675213.pdf. The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OCED”) also published a report on 
competitive restrictions in the legal profession. Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development [OECD], Competitive Restrictions in Legal Professions, OECD Doc. 
DAF/COMP(2007)39 (Apr. 27, 2009), available at http://oecd.org/dataoecd/12/38/
40080343.pdf. 
31. White Paper on Competition & Professional Services, supra note 30, COM 
(2004) 33 Final, at 9–10. 
32. See id. 
33. See id. at 22–23. A follow-up report was issued by the Commission in the 
following year. See Commission of the European Communities, Professional Services—
Scope for More Reform: Follow-up to the Report on Competition in Professional 
Services, COM (2004) 83, of 9 Febuary 2004, COM (2005) 405 Final (Aug. 2005). 
34. See Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsen, Rapport fra arbejdsgruppen 
vedrørende juridisk rådgivning mv. [Report of the Working Group on Legal Advice, 
etc.] (June 2004) (Den.), available at http://www.konkurrencestyrelsen.dk/en/service-
menu/publications/publication-file/publikationer-2004/konkurrencepolitisk-strategi/
rapport-fra-arbejdsgruppen-vedr-juridisk-raadgivning-mv-pdf-format. 
35. See THE COMPETITION AUTHORITY, COMPETITION IN PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: 
SOLICITORS & BARRISTERS (2006) (Ir.), available at http://www.tca.ie/images/
uploaded/documents/solicitors%20and%20barristers%20full%20report.pdf. 
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and the United Kingdom.36 In England and Wales this has, in 
part, lead to the Clementi review, a subsequent White Paper, and 
the current implementation of the Legal Services Act of 2007, the 
last of which includes the possibility of multi-disciplinary practice 
in alternative business structures, scheduled to start in October 
2011.37 
In much of Northern Europe, particularly in Scandinavian 
states, there is little or no protection of legal monopolies, leading 
to legal services often being supplied not by the formal legal 
profession, but rather by unregulated or semi-regulated legal 
advice providers, such as the jurist or Rettshjelper.38 There are also, 
across Europe, many legal education providers that are 
“unrecognized” by professional legal bodies and whose graduates 
are not easily able,39 or are even unable,40 to join the national 
legal professions under the traditional entry routes, but who are 
nevertheless able to supply legal services in other Member States 
with more liberal regulatory rules—and who subsequently may be 
able to take advantage of some of the new entry routes provided 
by EU internal market rules set out below. 
The providers of legal services are varied. Sophisticated 
purchasers of legal services provided by mega-sized firms (not all 
of which are necessarily members of self-regulating legal 
professions) can be contrasted with the small, solo legal 
practitioners and their largely un-knowledgeable clients (who 
therefore need a higher level of protection). The legal 
professions still seek a common high standard of competence at 
entry and highly value their unity and professional ethics. 
 
36. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, CONSULTATION ON THE FUTURE REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL SERVICES IN ENGLAND AND WALES (2004) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/professional_bodies/oft722.pdf. 
37. See LEGAL SERVS. BOARD, WIDER ACCESS, BETTER VALUE, STRONG PROTECTION: 
DISCUSSION PAPER ON DEVELOPING A REGULATORY REGIME FOR ALTERNATIVE BUSINESS 
STRUCTURES (2009), available at http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/
consultations/2009/pdf/140509.pdf. 
38. See, e.g., Webjuristene, Rettshjelper til halv advokatpris, 
http://www.webjuristene.no (last visited May 10, 2010) (Nor.). 
39. For example, those in England and Wales graduating with non-qualifying law 
degrees offered by some higher education institutions. 
40. For example, the Hochschule graduates in Germany, or those with business law 
degrees from Denmark or the Netherlands. 
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II. ENTRY CONTROLS, NATIONAL STANDARDS, AND 
EUROPEAN LAW 
The power of regulating entry by standard setting is 
exercised in a different manner by all the official legal 
professions in the EU and the EEA.41 Many factors influence how 
entry conditions are regulated in different Member States. This 
Article does not propose to investigate them all; instead, this 
Article will investigate the inroads made at the European level to 
these autonomous professional and governmental powers and 
will reflect on reactions thereto. 
National entry rules are under sustained pressure from 
various European developments. The entry barriers and 
rigorously regulated access to the legal profession in each state 
have, to a considerable extent, been trumped by European free 
access rules. Would-be lawyers no longer have to follow the 
prescribed national routes into the host state professions. It is not 
only the Union’s free movement rules that are knocking down 
the doors. As noted above, the Member States’ respective 
competition authorities are also asking for justifications of access-
restricting rules (and a lot more besides).42 Now, several EU 
mandated access points to EEA legal professions have been 
created. 
Citizens of EU and EEA Member States who are qualified 
lawyers have, in principle, a right to migrate. EU law traditionally 
asks if migrants are nationals (or spouses or dependant members 
of the family) of a Member State, and whether they are either 
employed (as workers), or are seeking to provide services or 
establish themselves in the host state. Different provisions of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community (“EC Treaty”) 
(now the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”)) apply in each case43 and all assume that the migrant is 
in the labor market or is economically active.44 
 
41. See European Lawyers’ Information Exchange & Internet Resource [ELIXIR], 
http://elixir.bham.ac.uk//index.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2010) (showing many of the 
entry regimes to European legal professions). See generally JULIAN LONBAY, TRAINING 
LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1990). 
42. See supra notes 29–37 and accompanying text. 
43. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union arts. 45, 49–50, 2010 O.J. C 83/47, at 65–68 [hereinafter TFEU] (establishing the 
free movement of workers, right of establishment, and free movement of services, 
respectively). Prior to the enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon, similar provisions were 
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The rise in use of EU citizenship (often called European 
citizenship),45 which is also recognized in legislation46 and the 
case law of the Court,47 has decreased the need for EU migrants 
to be economically active. The focus is more on the status of 
citizenship in the Union and migrants’ “lawful” presence as 
residents in the host state.48 Lawful residence for a sufficient 
duration49 will give rise not only to access to various elements of 
social welfare and job access benefits,50 but also, less 
controversially,51 to the host state professions and now their 
 
contained in the Treaty Establishing the European Community (“EC Treaty”). 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community arts. 39, 43, 
49, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37, at 57, 59, 62 [hereinafter EC Treaty] (establishing the free 
movement of workers, right of establishment, and free movement of services, 
respectively). 
44. See, e.g., Kempf v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case 139/85, [1986] E.C.R. 1741, 
¶ 16; Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case 53/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1035, ¶¶ 21–22. 
45. See TFEU, supra note 43, arts. 20–25, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 56–58. Prior to the 
enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon, similar provisions were contained in the EC Treaty. 
See EC Treaty, supra note 43, arts. 17–22, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 49–51. Citizenship of the 
Union was introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht. Treaty on European Union art. G(C), 
July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. C 191/1, at 7; see also Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community arts. 8–8c, 1992 O.J. C 224/1, at 11. 
46. Council Directive No. 2004/38 on the Rights of Citizens of the Union and 
Their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely within the Territory of the Member 
States, 2004 O.J. L 158/77, corrected version in 2004 O.J. L 229/35, corrected by 2005 
O.J. L 197/34, corrected by 2007 O.J. L 204/28 [hereinafter Citizenship Directive] 
(subsequent citations will be to the full-text English version at 2004 O.J. L 229/35, unless 
otherwise noted). 
47. See, e.g., Bidar v. London Borough of Ealing, Case C-209/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-
2119, ¶ 31; Zhu and Chen v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dept., Case C-200/02, [2004] 
E.C.R. I-9925, ¶ 47; Baumbast v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, Case C-413/99, 
[2002] E.C.R. I-7091, ¶ 94; Martínez Sala v. Bayern, Case C-85/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-2691, 
¶ 65. 
48. See Martínez Sala v. Bayern, Case C-85/96, [1998] E.C.R. 2691, ¶ 63. 
49. As yet, this is indeterminate and largely depends on the circumstances. See 
generally Robin C.A. White, Citizenship of the Union, Governance, and Equality, 29 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 790 (2006); Robin C.A. White, Conflicting Competences: Free Movement Rules and 
Immigration Laws, 29 EUR. L. REV. 385 (2004). 
50. See Catherine Barnard, EU Citizenship and Principle of Solidarity, in SOCIAL 
WELFARE AND EU LAW: ESSAYS IN EUROPEAN LAW 157 (Michael Dougan & Elanore 
Spaventa eds., 2005); Michael Dougan, The Constitutional Dimension to the Case Law on 
Union Citizenship, 31 EUR. L. REV. 613 (2006); Eleanor Spaventa, Seeing the Wood Despite 
the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship and Its Constitutional Effects, 45 COMMON MKT. 
L. REV. 13 (2008); Alina Tryfonidou, In Search of the Aim of the EC Free Movement 
Provisions: Has the Court of Justice Missed the Point?, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1591 (2009). 
51. Cf. Kay Hailbronner, Union Citizenship and Access to Social Benefits, 42 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 1245 (2005) (arguing that only after extensive negotiations were “non-
economically active Union citizens” covered by article 12 EC (now article 18 TFEU)). 
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training regimes. Subsequent access to professions is 
considerably facilitated by use of the directives on mutual 
recognition of qualifications, recently revised and consolidated,52 
coupled with an extensive interpretation of their provisions and 
the underlying treaty provisions by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. 
The deregulatory effects of the Court’s case law has not, in 
the main, been supplemented by “positive” harmonization in this 
field as each Member State jealously guards its sovereignty in the 
field of education53 and the transmission of national values or 
ethos.54 EU rules have not replaced or abandoned national laws 
that were seen as restrictive, even though they can only be 
replaced at the national level by rules that comply with EU law. 
Member States have placed some aspects of their educational 
policies into the sphere of the EU-wide Lisbon process,55 and yet 
more is to be found within the wider Sorbonne-Bologna 
process.56 However, Member States permit very little to be dealt 
with by the traditional Union method of decision-making, the 
main exceptions being the adoption of educational funding 
programs57 and the mutual recognition of national professional 
 
52. The latest comprehensive version is Parliament & Council Directive No. 
2005/36 on the Recognition of Professional Qualifications, 2005 O.J. L 255/22 
[hereinafter Professional Qualifications Recognition Directive]. 
53. Article 166(4) TFEU (formerly article 49(4) EC) specifically forbids 
harmonization of education laws across Member States while permitting incentive 
measures. TFEU, supra note 43, arts. 166(4), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 121. 
54. See Groener v. Minister for Education, Case C-379/87, [1989] E.C.R. I-3967, ¶¶ 
21, 24 (recognizing that Ireland can require vocational school teachers to be capable of 
speaking the national language). 
55. See Julian Lonbay, Reflections on Education and Culture in EC Law, in CULTURE 
AND EUROPEAN UNION LAW (Rachel Craufurd Smith ed., 2004). 
56. See Laurel S. Terry, The Bologna Process and Its Impact in Europe: It’s So Much More 
Than Degree Changes, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 107 (2008). The Sorbonne-Bologna 
Process, named after the two prominent European universities that launched the idea, is 
an initiative to achieve common educational policies across universities in different 
states with the goal of facilitating common approaches to access to higher education. See 
Joint Declaration of the European Ministers of Education (“Bologna Declaration”), 
June 19, 1999, reprinted in THE HERITAGE OF EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIES 189 (Nuria Sanz & 
Sjur Bergan eds., 2d ed. 2006); Joint Declaration on Harminisation of the Architecture 
of the European Higher Education System (“Sorbonne Declaration”), May 25, 1998, 
reprinted in THE HERITAGE OF EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIES, supra, at 185. Copies of the 
Bologna Declaration and the Sorbonne Declaration are electronically available at 
http://www.bologna-berlin2003.de/en/main_documents/index.htm. 
57. See, e.g., Parliament & Council Decision No. 1720/2006/EC on Establishing an 
Action Programme in the Field of Lifelong Learning, 2006 O.J. L 327/45. 
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qualifications, as mandated by single market concerns. The result 
is a patchwork of incoherent rules and principles that has forced 
non-state actors, partially within the Sorbonne-Bologna process 
and partially outside it but within the sphere of the internal 
market regime, to try and cope with the resulting deregulatory 
pressure. This Article will focus on the internal market aspects. 
The multitude of legal professions across the European 
Union has varying structures,58 customs, cultures, and legal 
traditions.59 The variation among entry requirements reflects this 
colorful diversity.60 Yet, despite these relatively deep differences 
in entry requirements, the EU has created some of the 
“particularly remarkable”61 and most dramatic rules for allowing 
free movement of lawyers and cross-jurisdictional practice rights 
in the world.62 These generous rules reflect the, perhaps 
surprising amount of mutual trust that bars and law societies in 
the EU and EEA must have in each other.63 While education and 
the regulation of legal professions in each Member State are 
classically considered as matters falling within the exclusive 
 
58. See Shigeru Kobori, Discussion Paper Presented by the Japan Federation of Bar 
Associations, 18 DICK. J. INT’L L. 109, 122 (1999) (discussing ownership structures). 
59. See generally FREE MOVEMENT OF LAWYERS (Hamish Adamson ed., 2d ed. 1998); 
LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra note 3; LAWYERS IN SOCIETY (Richard L. Abel & Philip 
S. C. Lewis eds., 1988); LONBAY, supra note 41. 
60. See Julian Lonbay, Differences in the Legal Education in the Member States of the 
European Community, in THE COMMON LAW OF EUROPE AND THE FUTURE OF LEGAL 
EDUCATION 75–94 (Bruno de Witte & Caroline Forder eds., 1992). See generally 
TOWARDS A EUROPEAN IUS COMMUNE IN LEGAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH (Michael 
Faure et al. eds., 2001). 
61. Wayne J. Carroll, Liberalization of National Legal Admissions Requirements in the 
European Union: Lessons and Implications, 22 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 563, 598 (2004); see 
also Mary C. Daly, The Ethical Implications of the Globalization of the Legal Profession: A 
Challenge to the Teaching of Professional Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 21 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1239 (1998). 
62. See Roger J. Goebel, Professional Qualification and Educational Requirements for 
Practice in a Foreign Country: Bridging the Cultural Gap, 63 TUL. L. REV. 443 (1989); 
Lonbay, supra note 3; see also IBA, supra note 20, recommendation 3 (proposing a set of 
relatively cautious and timid recommendations allowing for temporary cross-border 
practice). 
63. Apparently this is not found in the state jurisdictions of the United States. See 
Donald H. Rivkin, Translational Legal Practice, 33 INT’L L. 825, 828–29 (1998); cf. 
Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998) 
(ruling that New York lawyers breached the relevant California statute on the unlicensed 
practice of law). For further reading, see Ronald A. Brand, Uni-State Lawyers and 
Multinational Practice, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1135, 1139 (2001), and Roger J. 
Goebel, The Liberalization of Interstate Legal Practice in the European Union: Lessons for the 
United States, 34 INT’L LAW. 307, 308 (2000). 
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jurisdiction of that Member State,64 the EU’s internal market 
rules are having a major impact in this most national of spheres. 
These rules are briefly sketched out below.65 
There are three key European legislative provisions. The 
first relevant Directive is the Lawyers’ Services Directive 
77/249/EC.66 This Directive allows lawyers to carry out cross-
border legal services and lists the types of lawyers to which it is 
applicable.67 However, the list is rather limited and does not 
include all of the types of lawyers or legal service providers that in 
fact exist. Nonetheless, the Directive does authorize temporary 
multi-jurisdictional practice for these listed types of lawyers.68 
The second legislative instrument, Directive 98/5 
(“Establishment Directive”), allows for the establishment of 
European Union nationals who are members of an EU legal 
profession in another Member State.69 There are two modes of 
establishment for lawyers under this Directive. One is 
establishment as a home state lawyer.70 For example, a French 
avocat can relocate to England while retaining his or her status as 
an avocat and, as such, he or she can practice French law, English 
law, and European law without limit. It is important to recognize 
that, pursuant to the directive, a migrant lawyer can simply 
 
64. See Mauri v. Ministero della Giustizia, Case C-250/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-1267, ¶¶ 
41–45; Council of Europe, Recommendation to Member States on the Freedom of Exercise of the 
Profession of Lawyers, 727th meeting of Ministers’ Deputies, Doc. No. R(2000)21 (Oct. 25, 
2000); Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27–Sept. 7, 1990,, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, 
¶¶ 9–11, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 144/28/Rev. 1 (1990). 
65. See generally FREE MOVEMENT OF LAWYERS, supra note 59; SERGE-PIERRE 
LAGUETTE, LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1987); LONBAY, supra note 41; 
CCBE CROSS-BORDER PRACTICE COMPENDIUM (Donald Little ed., 1991); THE LEGAL 
PROFESSIONS IN THE NEW EUROPE: A Handbook for Practioners (Alan Tyrrell & Zahd 
Yaqub eds., 2d ed. 1996); Roger J. Goebel, Lawyers in the European Community’s Progress 
Towards Community Rights of Practice, 15 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 556 (1991). 
66. Lawyers’ Services Directive, supra note 15, 1977 O.J. L 78/17. 
67. Id. art. 2, at 17. 
68. The directive lists a few derogations from otherwise free practice rights. See 
SJOERD CLAESSENS, FREE MOVEMENT OF LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 77–280 (Wolf 
Legal Publishers, 2008); Julian Lonbay, The Regulation of Legal Practice in the United 
Kingdom and Beyond, in UK LAW FOR THE MILLENNIUM 594, 594–633 (2d ed. 2000). 
69. Establishment Directive, supra note 16, 1998 O.J. L 77; see also CLAESSENS, supra 
note 68, at 140–48; Julian Lonbay, Lawyers Bounding Over the Borders: The Draft Directive 
on Lawyers’ Establishment (1996) 21 EUR. L. REV. 50–58; House of Lords Session 1994-
1995 14th Report of the Select Committee on the European Communities The Right of 
Establishment for Lawyers (July 11, 1995) (House of Lords Paper 82). 
70. Establishment Directive, supra note 16, art. 2, 1998 O.J. L 77, at 38. 
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establish under his or her home state title, and practice host state 
law without joining the host state legal profession. Currently, 
there are over 250 Registered European Lawyers with the Law 
Society of England and Wales. Overall, it is estimated that just 
under 4,000 EEA lawyers are registered outside their own 
jurisdiction.71 
The other mode opened by Directive 98/5 is to transform 
oneself into a host state lawyer,72 a new entry route to 
membership of bars and law societies. Fully qualified lawyers 
from other EEA Member States can practice and join a host state 
bar or law society with no prior examination of their 
competence.73 They can become local lawyers after three years of 
relevant legal practice in the host state, with no formal 
examination to complete.74 Bars and law societies rely on the 
integrity of their members as lawyers to limit their practice to 
areas in which they are competent, as mandated by the duty set 
out in article 3.1.3 of the Council of Bars and Law Societies of 
Europe (“CCBE”) Code of Conduct, which states: 
A lawyer shall not handle a matter which he knows or ought 
to know he is not competent to handle, without co-operating 
with a lawyer who is competent to handle it. A lawyer shall 
not accept instructions unless he can discharge those 
instructions promptly having regard to the pressure of other 
work.75 
The new stream of host-state lawyers76 do not normally have the 
broad range of knowledge of host-state law that the national 
regime typically requires of those who enter through their 
normal admission processes. 
 
71. CCBE, TABLE OF LAWYERS (2008), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/
user_upload/NTCdocument/Table_of_Lawyers_in_1_1264506152.pdf. 
72. Establishment Directive, supra note 16, art. 10, 1998 O.J. L 77, at 40–41. This is 
most easily done through use of article 10 of Directive 98/5, but can also be achieved 
through the mutual recognition route described above. See supra note 52 and 
accompanying text. 
73. Establishment Directive, supra note 16, art. 10, 1998 O.J. L 77, at 40–41. 
74. Advocate General Colomber, in a “brilliant piece of legal analysis” considered 
that the right to establish could be based on article 43 EC alone. Pedro Cabral, 
Comment, 39 COMMON MKT L. REV. 129, 136 (2002). 
75. CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 18, § 3.1.3. 
76. In England and Wales, over 160 former Registered European Lawyers are now 
English and Welsh solicitors. 
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Luxembourg challenged the legality of Directive 98/5 after 
it was adopted, claiming that it was discriminatory in that migrant 
lawyers under the Directive have an easier entry route than 
nationals.77 Luxembourg argued that article 43 EC (now article 
49 TFEU) requires equal treatment78 and not an easier route into 
the profession of avocat.79 
The European Court of Justice acknowledged that the 
migrant lawyer could have relatively little knowledge of local law 
but stressed that, as lawyers, they would know that they may not 
undertake legal work in which they were not competent.80 In 
effect, relevant knowledge is acknowledged to be essential, but 
the migrant lawyer will have to exercise self-restraint and not 
practice in areas where he or she is not competent. The Court 
indicated that this professional knowledge simply did not need to 
be proved in advance.81 Thus, there exists a new route to join the 
legal profession of another Member State. The principle of equal 
treatment is not breached because the migrant lawyer is not in a 
similar situation to a host state trainee, subject to the national 
route. As Directive 98/5 did not alter the routes of national 
educational and training, there was no need to fall back on 
article 47(2) EC82 as a legal basis. As the Court of Justice 
indicated: 
 
77. Luxembourg v. European Parliament, Case C-168/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-9131. 
78. EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 43, 2006 O.J. C 321E, at 59. Article 43 (now article 
49 TFEU) reads in full: 
  Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the 
freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of 
another Member State shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to 
restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals 
of any Member State established in the territory of any Member State. Freedom 
of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed 
persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or 
firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 48, under the 
conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such 
establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of the chapter relating to 
capital. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
79. Opinion of Advocate General Colomer, Luxembourg, [2000] E.C.R. I-9131, ¶¶ 
16–18 (summarizing the equal treatment argument of the government of Luxembourg). 
80. Luxembourg, [2000] E.C.R. I-9131, ¶ 31. For comparison, see the standards of 
competence promulgated by other bar associations supra note 18. 
81. See Luxembourg, [2000] E.C.R. I-9131, ¶¶ 42–43; see also Opinion of Advocate 
General Colomer, Luxembourg, [2000] E.C.R. I-9131, ¶¶ 66–72. 
82. EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 47(2), 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 61. 
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 It would therefore seem that the Community legislature, 
with a view to making it easier for a particular class of 
migrant lawyers to exercise the fundamental freedom of 
establishment, has chosen, in preference to a system of a 
priori testing of qualification in the national law of the host 
Member State, a plan of action combining consumer 
information, restrictions on the extent to which or the 
detailed rules under which certain activities of the profession 
may be practised, a number of applicable rules of 
professional conduct, compulsory insurance, as well as a 
system of discipline involving both the competent authorities 
of the home Member State and the host State. The 
legislature has not abolished the requirement that the lawyer 
concerned should know the national law applicable in the 
cases he handles, but has simply released him from the 
obligation to prove that knowledge in advance. It has thus 
allowed, in some circumstances, gradual assimilation of 
knowledge through practice, that assimilation being made 
easier by experience of other laws gained in the home 
Member State. It was also able to take account of the 
dissuasive effect of the system of discipline and the rules of 
professional liability.83 
Thus, article 10 of the Establishment Directive creates a 
special mode of establishment that gives EEA lawyers access to 
the host state legal profession.84 In short, they can convert and 
become local lawyers after three years of relevant legal practice in 
the host State, without a formal examination.85 Article 10 of the 
Establishment Directive allows lawyers to cross-qualify very easily. 
This may seem odd, because what an English solicitor does in 
initial training is completely different in many respects from what 
a German Rechtsanwalt must do. Yet, after three years of practice 
in another EU or EEA Member State, the migrant lawyer can join 
the bar or law society of the host state.86 
The third legislative measure is Directive 89/48 (“Diploma 
Directive”),87 which preceded the Establishment Directive, but is 
 
83. Luxembourg, [2000] E.C.R. I-9131, ¶ 43. 
84. Establishment Directive, supra note 16, art. 10, 1998 O.J. L 77, at 40–41. 
85. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
86. Id. 
87. Council Directive No. 89/48 on a General System for the Recognition of 
Higher-Education Diplomas Awarded on Completion of Professional Education and 
Training of at Least Three Years Duration, 1989 O.J. L 19/16, amended by Directive 
2001/19, 2001 O.J. L 206/1 [hereinafter Diploma Directive]. 
  
2010] FREE MOVEMENT OF LAWYERS IN THE EU 1645 
considered to be less important for lawyers now because of the 
ease of quasi-automatic recognition under the Establishment 
Directive. Directive 89/48, now replaced by a more 
comprehensive Directive 2005/36 (“Professional 
Qualifications”),88 allowed members of regulated professions, 
including lawyers, to have their qualifications recognized in 
another Member State in order to enable cross-border practice.89 
Recognition is not automatic, however, and competence may be 
tested or entry subjected to an “adaptation period,” in certain 
circumstances. Under this Directive, the “competent authority” 
of the host state has a duty to assess migrants and note what 
specific elements of qualification are missing.90 If some element 
is missing, the professional concerned must pass an “aptitude 
test” or undergo a period of “adaptation,” collectively referred to 
in the relevant legislation as a “compensation mechanism,” in 
order to join the host state’s equivalent profession.91 In the case 
of lawyers, there is an exception that allows the host state to insist 
on an aptitude test.92 As a result, all European bars, except 
Denmark’s Advokatsamfundet, employ an aptitude test to allow 
transmigration of colleagues from other EU and EEA countries. 
The Directive supports the growth of mutual confidence between 
the competent authorities of Member States, and the diplomas 
are recognized as they “give the right to take up a regulated 
profession” in the host state.93 The mutual recognition of 
qualifications regimes,94 with the exception of medically-related 
 
88. Professional Qualifications Recognition Directive, supra note 52, 2005 O.J. L 
255. 
89. Diploma Directive, supra note 87, art. 3, 1989 O.J. L 19, at 19. 
90. Id. art. 8(2), at 20. 
91. Id. art. 4(1)(b), at 19. This so-called “compensation mechanism” is also found 
in article 14 of the Professional Qualifications Directive, supra note 52, 2005 O.J. L 255, 
at 13. 
92. Diploma Directive, supra note 87, art. 4(1)(b), 1989 O.J. L 19, at 19 (carving 
out this exception for “professions whose practice requires precise knowledge of 
national law and in respect of which the provision of advice and/or assistance 
concerning national law is an essential and constant aspect of the professional activity”). 
This same principle is also found in article 14(3) of the Professional Qualifications 
Recognition Directive, supra note 52, 2005 O.J. L 255, at 33. 
93. Beuttenmüller v. Land Baden-Württemberg, Case C-102/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-
5405, ¶ 52. 
94. See generally HILDEGARD SCHNEIDER, DIE ANERKENNUNG VON DIPLOMEN IN DER 
EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT [THE RECOGNITION OF DIPLOMAS IN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY] (1995); J. Pertek, Free Movement of Professionals and Recognition of Higher-
Education Diplomas, 12 Y.B. EUR. L. 293 (1992); Hildegard Schneider, The Free Movement 
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professions where common minimum levels of training were 
specifically established,95 deliberately left the issue of competence 
and regulation of qualification regimes within the national 
orbit.96 National jurisdiction exercised in this field still has to 
respect the principles of EU law,97 and the Court fairly early on 
required procedural safeguards for EU citizens utilizing these 
new rights.98 This access route remains important.99 Whether the 
Diploma Directive or Professional Qualifications Recognition 
Directive can act as a shortcut to enable nationals to avoid 
lengthy or difficult national training requirements is being tested 
again in the Koller case.100 While Directive 98/5 applies only to 
certain named and narrowly specified legal professions, the 
Professional Qualifications Recognition Directive allows for 
 
of Lawyers in Europe and Its Consequences for the Legal Profession and the Legal Education in 
the Member States, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN IUS COMMUNE IN LEGAL EDUCATION AND 
RESEARCH, supra note 60, at 15. 
95. See Julian Lonbay, The Free Movement of Health Care Professionals in the European 
Community, in PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND EUROPEAN LAW 45 
(Richard Goldberg & Julian Lonbay eds., 2001). 
96. The second paragraph of article 49 TFEU (formerly article 43 EC) on the right 
of establishment gives access to self-employment:  
  Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue 
activities as self-employed persons . . . under the conditions laid down for its 
own nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is effected, 
subject to the provisions of the chapter relating to capital. 
TFEU, supra note 43, art. 49, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 67. 
97. See Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, 
Case C-55/94, [1995] E.C.R. I-4165. 
98. See Union Nationale des Entraîneurs et Cadres Techniques Professionnels du 
Football v. Heylens, Case 222/86, [1987] E.C.R. 4097. 
99. See Ebert v. Budapesti Ügyvédi Kamara, Case C-359/09 (pending case). 
100. Koller v. Rechtsanwaltsprufungskomimission beim Oberlanders- gericht Graz, 
Case C-118/09 (pending case); see also Consiglio Nazionale degli Ingegneri v. Ministero 
della Giustizia, Case C-311/06 [2009] E.C.R. I-415 (ruling that the host Member State 
competent authority can seek to maintain nationally set professional competence 
standards). In Koller, Robert Koller, the holder of a law degree from the University of 
Vienna (Magister der Rechtswissenschaften), went to Spain, where, after passing several 
additional law courses at the University of Madrid, his Viennese degree was 
homologated as equivalent to the Spanish law degree (Licenciado en Derecho) thus 
enabling him to register in Madrid as a Spanish lawyer. He then returned to Austria and 
requested access to the profession of lawyer (Rechtsanwalt) relying upon the provisions 
of the Austrian implementation of Directive 89/48. He sought an exemption from the 
required aptitude test on the basis of his Austrian law degree thus potentially evading 
the Austrian five year practice requirement. His request was refused and the matter is 
currently up for decision before the Court, following the preliminary ruling procedure. 
Koller, Case C-118-09 (pending case). 
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transmutation from professions not listed in Directive 98/5 or 
from professional activities not regulated in the home state.101 
These, then, are the legislative routes that the EU has 
opened up to allow for cross-qualification and cross-border 
practice of law. Europe has a regime that allows lawyers to follow 
their clients to different states and advise them there. Once 
qualified, lawyers can more or less freely practice in any EU or 
EEA state; in the name of the creation of a single market the EU 
mandates that businesses should be able to find a suitable mix of 
legal services. However, the EU influence has now spread beyond 
this realm to national rules that regulate pre-qualification 
education and training. 
The Professional Qualifications Recognition Directive 
2005/36 must also be interpreted in accordance with the Court’s 
judgment in Vlassopoulou.102 The judgment effectively mandates 
that the entry doors must be open to EU and EEA legal 
professionals, because the competent authority of the host state 
must assess migrant lawyers to examine the extent of any missing 
attribute in their lawyering or other necessary professional skills 
and knowledge and permit the applicant migrant to make up the 
deficiency.103 By the very terms of the only exception carved out 
in the Recognition Directive (as well as its Diploma Directive 
precursor), the host state can insist on an aptitude test for 
“professions whose practice requires precise knowledge of 
national law and in respect of which the provision of advice or 
assistance concerning national law is an essential and constant 
aspect of the professional activity.”104 The Professional 
Qualifications Recognition Directive provides that professional 
rules of conduct, or codes of deontology, can be tested as part of 
the aptitude test.105 The EU thus explicitly recognizes the 
importance of ethical codes in the definition of an aptitude test. 
 
101. Establishment Directive, supra note 16, 1998 O.J. L 77; cf. Professional 
Qualifications Recognition Directive, supra note 52, 2005 O.J. L 255. 
102. Vlassopoulou v. Ministerium für Justiz, Case 340/89, [1991] E.C.R. I-2357. 
103. Id. ¶¶ 19–22. 
104. See discussion supra note 92. The new consolidated Directive was initially going 
to be rather radical. The option to insist on an aptitude test was slated to disappear in an 
earlier draft. See Proposed Parliament and Council Directive on the Recognition of 
Professional Qualifications, COM(2003) 119. 
105. Professional Qualifications Recognition Directive, supra note 52, art. 3(1)(h), 
2005 O.J. L 255, at 28 (defining the content of “aptitude test”). 
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It is clear from Hocsman106 that article 49 TFEU (previously article 
43 EC) can still apply even though there are applicable 
Directives107 in the field.108 This article requires that migrants be 
treated equally when subjected to any relevant national laws.109 As 
the Court held in Gebhard: “the taking-up and pursuit of certain 
self-employed activities may be conditional on complying with 
certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action justified by the general good, such as rules relating to 
organization, qualifications, professional ethics, supervision and 
liability.”110 
So, even though professional activities undertaken in the 
Member States can be regulated, 
national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the 
exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty 
must fulfil four conditions: they must be applied in a non-
discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative 
requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable 
for securing the attainment of the objective which they 
pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in 
order to attain it.111 
While requiring a “national” law degree, the Court held in 
Gebhard: 
[I]n applying their national provisions, Member States may 
not ignore the knowledge and qualifications already 
acquired by the person concerned in another Member State. 
Consequently, they must take account of the equivalence of 
diplomas and if necessary proceed to a comparison of 
 
106. Hocsman v. Ministre de l’Emploi et de la Solidarité, Case C-238/98, [2000] 
E.C.R. I-6623. The Court made it clear in this case that the principle of assessment of 
migrants was “inherent in the fundamental freedoms” protected by the EC Treaty. Id. ¶ 
24. 
107. See discussion supra notes 69–101. 
108. Hocsman, [2000] E.C.R. I-6623, ¶¶ 31–34; see Morgenbesser v. Consiglio 
dell’Ordine degli Avvocati di Genova, Case C-313/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-13,467, ¶ 58 
(confirming the holding in Hocsman, [2000] E.C.R. I-6623); Sam McCauley Chemists 
(Blackpool) Ltd. v. Pharm. Soc’y of Ir., Case C-221/05 [2006] E.C.R. I-6869, ¶ 24. 
109. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
110. Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, Case 
C-55/94, [1995] E.C.R. I-4165, ¶ 35 (citing Thieffry v. Conseil de l’Ordre des Avocats à 
la Cour de Paris, Case C-71/76, [1977] E.C.R. 765, ¶ 12). 
111. Id. ¶ 37 (citing Kraus v. Land Baden-Württemberg, Case C-19/92, [1993] 
E.C.R. I-1663, ¶ 32). 
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knowledge and qualifications required by their national rules 
and those of the person concerned.112 
In Vlassopoulou, it had already been made clear that the 
indistinctly applicable requirement of a national qualification 
would hinder the exercise of the right of establishment.113 
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Partial Practice Rights 
Two recent developments take the trend of recognition of 
non-national training and practice one step further. One of the 
most radical proposals, the partial practice provision, was 
rejected during the negotiation of the new Recognition Directive 
2005/36.114 The Commission’s initial draft of this directive would 
have provided that an incoming migrant who is not sufficiently 
qualified to go through with an adaptation period or aptitude 
test would nevertheless be allowed to practice that element of a 
profession at which he or she is skilled.115 For instance, a lawyer 
from an EU or EEA Member State who specializes in competition 
law could, on the basis of this provision, gain admission to 
practice only competition law in the host state.116 Such “lawyers” 
would not be members of the host state legal profession after 
“admission” to the legal market, but they would have a license to 
practice competition law there. 
 
112. Id. ¶ 38 (citing Vlassopoulou v. Ministerium für Justiz, Case 340/89, [1991] 
E.C.R. I-2357, ¶¶ 15–16; Thieffry v. Conseil de l’Ordre des Avocats à la Cour de Paris, 
Case C-71/76, [1977] E.C.R. 765, ¶¶ 19, 27). 
113. Vlassopoulou, [1991] E.C.R. I-2357, ¶ 15. 
114. See Council of the European Union, Common Position Adopted by the 
Council on 21 December 2004 with a View to the Adoption of a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Recognition of Professional 
Qualifications, Doc. 13781/2/04/Rev.2/Add.1, at 5, ¶ 15 (Dec. 2004) (expressing the 
Council’s decision to delete the draft provision concerning partial access to the host 
State’s profession). The bars successfully joined forces with other professional 
organizations to persuade the government to delete this particular provision. 
115. See Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Recognition of Professional 
Qualifications, COM (2002) 199 Final, art. 4(3), at 16 (Mar. 2002), reprinted in 2002 O.J. 
C 181 E/183. 
116. See, e.g., Rivkin, supra note 63, at 826 (proposing that a host country test only 
“subject matter reasonably related to the applicants’ intended fields of practice in the 
host country”). 
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The increasing specialization of the legal professions, 
particularly in the very large commercial law firms of England,117 
is becoming seen as a fragmentation of the profession that calls 
into question the ability of the profession to be regulated by a 
single ethical code.118 This trend emphasizes the potential 
difficulties of professional deregulation on a grand scale, which 
we might be witnessing within the EU and EEA. 
Although this “partial practice” provision was dropped from 
the final text of the Professional Qualifications Recognition 
Directive, the issue reemerged in the Colegio de Ingenieros case.119 
The question at stake was whether there should be a “restricted 
recognition” of a migrant’s qualifications under the Diploma 
Directive 89/48, or, alternatively, under article 39 EC (now 
article 45 TFEU) or article 43 EC (now article 49 TFEU).120 In 
that case, a hydraulic engineer from Italy was missing several core 
elements of the relevant qualifications for the Spanish 
engineering profession.121 This case had the potential to have 
very significant results for lawyers, raising the specter of 
specialized practice certificates or licenses, which, as noted 
above, encourages the fragmentation of professions. In the 
Opinion of the Advocate General, a limited practice right could 
be granted if the migrant consents, thus avoiding the necessity 
for further aptitude tests or adaptation periods by the migrant.122 
The Court decided that partial recognition of qualifications 
is not precluded by the Diploma Directive and, even more, might 
be required by article 39 EC (now article 45 TFEU) and article 43 
EC (now article 49 TFEU) in some circumstances.123 The Court 
indicated that a refusal to allow partial recognition, in 
appropriate cases, could be considered a hindrance to free 
movement of persons and therefore contravene article 39 EC 
 
117. See Andrew M. Francis, Legal Ethics, the Marketplace and the Fragmentation of 
Legal Professionalism, 12 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 173, 177 (2005) (indicating that the 
smallest of the top twenty law firms in England has over 1,000 fee-earners). 
118. Id. at 185–89 (arguing that the professional associations are no longer in a 
position to regulate the profession with the growth of large law firms). 
119. Colegio de Ingenieros de Caminos, Canales y Puertos v. Administración del 
Estado, Case C-330/03, [2006] E.C.R. I-801. 
120. Id. ¶ 15. 
121. Id. ¶¶ 10–12. 
122. Opinion of Advocate General Léger, Colegio de Ingenieros, [2006] E.C.R. I-801, 
¶ 44. 
123. Colegio de Ingenieros, [2006] E.C.R. I-801, ¶¶ 26, 39. 
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(now article 45 TFEU) and article 43 EC (now article 49 
TFEU).124 Such a hindrance might be justified under the 
rationale of Gebhard.125 The Court noted, however, that the risk of 
misleading recipients or consumers of services could be 
overcome by appropriate use of titles and languages.126 
If the migrant’s profession is broadly the same as the host 
state profession under the Professional Qualifications 
Recognition Directive, and the differences in competences can 
be resolved by use of the compensation measures found in article 
14, which allows full access to the host state profession, then this 
route must be used;127 the migrant cannot evade the 
compensation measures. However, if the professions, or the 
training and education for the professions, do not sufficiently 
overlap, then the Directive would not apply, and the competent 
authority of the host state must assess whether the professional 
activity of the migrant can be objectively separated out from the 
other tasks that the profession in question typically undertakes in 
the host state.128 In this respect, the host state authority can look 
to the practice in the home state for partial guidance. If the 
activity can be objectively separated out, and if there are 
substantial differences that would effectively mean a complete 
retraining in order to join the host state profession and the 
migrant requests partial recognition, then the host state cannot 
prohibit partial practice. However, the host state authority can 
establish some justified safeguards if it can prove that there is an 
overriding reason in the general interest which demands the 
safeguards, and that they are suitable for securing this objective, 
and that the safeguards are absolutely necessary. 
It seems that although the legal professions contained in the 
list from the Lawyers’ Services Directive129 would undoubtedly be 
members of the “profession in question,” the substantial 
differences in knowledge from one state to another would 
nevertheless often require as much retraining as for the 
 
124. Id. ¶ 31. 
125. Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, Case 
C-55/94, [1995] E.C.R. I-4165, ¶ 32. 
126. Colegio de Ingenieros, [2006] E.C.R. I-801, ¶ 38. 
127. See Professional Qualifications Recognition Directive, supra note 52, art. 14, 
2005 O.J. L 255, at 33. 
128.  Colegio de Ingenieros, [2006] E.C.R. I-801, ¶ 38. 
129. See Lawyers’ Services Directive, supra note 15 1977 O.J. L 78. 
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engineers in Colegio de Ingenieros, which means that an applicant 
to a national bar might be tempted to request partial practice 
rights pursuant to that judgment. It would, of course, be open to 
them to rely directly upon the Establishment Directive (if they 
were members of one of the legal professions listed therein), 
which would allow them all the rights they need in order to 
practice under home or eventually host state professional title, 
thus specializing as they please. In this way, the Establishment 
Directive might be used as a relief valve for members of the legal 
professions recognized within this instrument. 
An interesting question arises, however, when one considers 
how the rule would be applied to those already practicing in a 
specialized area of law, but outside of the legal professions 
mentioned in Directive 98/5. For example, a Finnish jurist 
experienced in mergers and acquisitions work or, perhaps more 
likely, a belastingadviseur or fiscalisten130 from the Netherlands 
experienced in tax law, might seek to practice that specialty in a 
host state that maintained rules prohibiting unlicensed legal 
practice, such as Greece or Germany.131 It appears from Colegio de 
Ingenieros that such a practitioner may be entitled to partial 
practice rights in the host state if this professional activity could 
be objectively separated out from the other activities pursued by 
German Rechtsanwaelte. One criterion for determining whether 
the activity in question can be “objectively separated” is whether 
it can be pursued autonomously or independently in the home 
state.132 If the activity can be practiced autonomously in the home 
state, then the migrant should be allowed partial practice rights. 
Clearly, in the states with a relatively deregulated provision of 
legal services and those with a high level of specialization, where 
lawyers de facto specialize and in some cases have a recognized 
regime of specialization qualifications, the logic should be that 
the migrant specialist should be permitted to practice, though 
precluded from joining the profession in question. 
A difficult issue arising from the effects of such regulatory 
fragmentation is the threat to the “unity” of the legal professions. 
 
130. See Lonbay, supra note 41, at 89. 
131. See Rechtsberatungsgesetz [RberG] [Legal Counseling Act], Dec. 13, 1935 
RGBl. I at 1478, § 1 (F.R.G.); Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung [BRAO] [Federal Lawyers 
Code], Aug. 1, 1959 BGBl. I at 565, § 3. 
132. See Colegio de Ingenieros, [2006] E.C.R. I-801, ¶ 37. 
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If migrants can pick off elements of professional activity under 
the emerging EU citizenship rights, why should the host state 
nationals not also benefit? Individuals wishing to practice in a 
particular narrow area of law might wish, for example, to avoid 
learning about criminal law, family law, or other areas of law 
altogether and may not wish to join the profession, but instead 
prefer to practice in their chosen area of specialization.133 To 
some extent, one can distinguish the two situations. The 
specialist migrant may have been subject to home state rules and 
regulations. In some cases, however, there may have been no 
such rules in place. EU law certainly did not intend to provide a 
carte blanche for migrants to evade host state regulations.134 
Although national admission rules have been challenged by 
the new EU admission routes, the EU cannot simply demolish 
Member State entry regimes for professionals. Member States can 
preclude partial practice if the migrant’s shortcomings can 
effectively be made up through the use of the compensation 
mechanisms of article 14 of the Professional Qualifications 
Recognition Directive.135 Because Directive 89/48 was in use for 
about fifteen years until being recently replaced and members of 
the legal professions mentioned in Directives 77/249 and 98/5 
have since used its provisions, one could argue initially that the 
compensatory burden is not apparently too great. It could, also 
be argued, however, that there would have been a much larger 
migration of lawyers in the absence of the relatively heavy burden 
imposed on migrants, at least in movement between national 
jurisdictions, which have the greatest differences in entry 
requirements. An aptitude test could certainly be used to deter 
potential migrants.136 The host state can justify the refusal of 
 
133. Some professions, such as nursing, allow specialization without prior 
generalization. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, INTERNAL MARKET DIRECTORATE GENERAL, 
STUDY OF SPECIALIST NURSES IN EUROPE 9 (2000), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/qualifications/nurses/nurses-study-2000_en.htm. 
134. See Alina Tryfonidou, Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations: An 
Incongruity in a Citizens’ Europe, 35 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 43 (2008). 
135. See Professional Qualifications Recognition Directive, supra note 52, art. 14 
2005 O.J. L 255, at 33. 
136. See Opinion of Advocate General Léger, Colegio de Ingenieros de Caminos, 
Canales y Puertos v. Administración del Estado, [2006] E.C.R. I-801, ¶¶ 76–77 
(indicating that the adaptation period and aptitude test found in article 4 of the 
Diploma Directive (now article 14 of the Professional Qualifications Recognition 
Directive) could “seriously discourage” or “strongly dissuade” a potential migrant). 
  
1654 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1629 
partial practice rights on the basis of “overriding reasons based 
on the general interest” that are proportional.137 The question 
has yet to be definitively resolved, but it should be noted here 
that some EU jurisdictions currently require a relatively low level 
of local legal knowledge. This is notably the case in Cyprus and 
Luxembourg, where the bars, in the absence of local universities 
with law faculties, have traditionally accepted overseas legal 
education and training with some additional training in the local 
law.138 
B. The Partially-Trained Lawyer 
In 2003, another significant development was presented by 
the Morgenbesser case, causing even bigger ripples.139 In 
Morgenbesser, a law student obtained a law degree in France, then 
went to Italy and requested access to the professional practice 
regime for avvocati (Italian lawyers).140 The Italian bar decided 
that the law student either needed an Italian law degree or 
should get an Italian university to recognize her French law 
degree as equivalent to an Italian laurea in giurisprudenza (law 
degree) before entering the Italian legal training regime.141 
Various questions were referred to the Court, which came out 
with several key rulings. First, the bar itself must decide on 
whether an applicant satisfies the necessary qualifications; it 
cannot rely on or require a university or a Ministry of Education 
or anybody else to check academic equivalence.142 This ruling 
seems to override its earlier ruling in Thieffry where the Paris bar 
had to accept the University of Paris’s acceptance of a Belgian law 
degree for admission to the French bar’s legal training CAPA 
 
137. See supra note 111. 
138. See infra notes 163–164 and accompanying text. 
139. See generally Morgenbesser v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati di Genova, 
Case C-313/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-13,467; see also CCBE, CHRONOLOGY (I), ANALYSIS (II) 
AND GUIDANCE (III) TO BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES REGARDING CASE C-313/01 CHRISTINE 
MORGENBESSER V CONSIGLIO DELL’ORDINE DEGLI AVVOCATI DI GENOVA 5TH CHAMBER 
(2003) [hereinafter Morgenbesser Report] available at http:// www.ccbe.org/ fileadmin/ 
user_upload/ NTCdocument/ morgenbesser_guidanc1_1183976940.pdf. 
140. See Morgenbesser Report, supra note 139, at 2. 
141. Id. 
142. Assessment of academic equivalence was in any case illegitimate in this 
context. Id. at 4. 
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admission examination.143 The Paris bar could not justify such a 
refusal by proving a “general good.”144 
Second, the Court extended the case law to allow partially 
trained potential lawyers to travel and have access to legal 
training in a host state.145 This has a highly deregulatory effect on 
accredited access routes to the professions because a migrant can 
come in with a foreign diploma, which is not recognized in the 
host state, and insist on being assessed for the purpose of joining 
a professional training regime. The host state’s competent 
authority must assess the applicant’s qualifications.146 It cannot 
say to that person, “Go and get an English law degree; go and do 
the English legal practice course; go and pass all the usual exams 
and then come back.” The host state competent authority must 
assess an applicant’s credentials and determine what they lack.147 
If there is nothing missing, it must let them onto the practice 
course or training regime. If elements are still missing, then it is 
up to the person seeking entry to fill in the remaining gaps. 
Until the Peśla case, it was uncertain whether a host state 
could require assessment of such an applicant by requiring the 
applicant to sit for an examination.148 It was clear that a 
competent authority could make this an option for the migrant, 
but it was not at all clear that the state could oblige the migrant 
do it. After Peśla, it seems that after an initial assessment the host 
Member State competent authority can thereafter, by 
examination, assess whether gaps identified in the initial 
assessment have been closed.149 Such an exam system must be 
 
143. Thieffry v. Conseil de l’Ordre des Avocats à la Cour de Paris, Case C-71/76, 
[1977] E.C.R. 765. 
144. Id. ¶ 12 (ruling that freedom of establishment, reconciled with the application 
of national professional rules, is “justified by the general good”). 
145. See Morgenbesser Report, supra note 139, at 4. 
146. See id. at 5. 
147. See id. (discussing the duties of the competent authority); see also Julian 
Lonbay, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility in a Global Context, 4 WASH. U. GLOB. 
STUD. L. REV. 609, 615 (2005). 
148. Peśla v. Justizministerium Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Case C-345/08, (ECJ 
Dec. 10, 2009) (not yet reported). 
149. Mr. Peśla had mixed German-Polish law degrees awarded by the Universities 
of Poznán and Frankfurt-an der-Oder. The Ministry of Justice of the Land of 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern considered that his resulting knowledge of German law was 
not equivalent to that of those who had passed the German First State exam. Id. ¶ 12. 
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flexible so as to avoid re-examination of topics that the applicant 
may have already covered in sufficient depth.150 
This new Court ruling places a major assessment burden on 
the host state’s bar, law society, or other relevant competent 
authority. In Italy, for example, the regional bars are not 
accustomed to assessing foreign law degrees. In Germany and 
other Member States where the state or the courts actually admit 
applicants to the Bar, there are real problems in determining 
who should make these assessments and upon whom the burden 
should fall.151 This is a new and highly deregulated route to 
joining a legal profession, and the likely result could be an 
increase in the number of bar or law society “final” exams 
imposed on all entrants because examinations can be considered 
a neutral means of assessing a person’s ability. 
The Morgenbesser case152 has thus broken the traditional 
mold even though, on its face, it appears to be simply an 
extension of the Vlassopoulou principle.153 One reason it is unique 
is that the Morgenbesser applicants are not “finished products” in 
the traditional sense.154 They are, by definition, still in the 
training process. The current EU Directive on the mutual 
recognition of professional qualifications is based on the notion 
of the recognition of the final product of education and training 
that gives professionals access to the relevant profession or 
 
150. Id. ¶¶ 59–60 (discussing the required nature and depth of the legal 
examinations). 
151. Germany amended the Deutsches Richtergesetz with paragraph 112a following 
the Morgenbesser case. See Peśla, Case C-345/08, ¶ 10 (ECJ Dec. 10, 2009) (not yet 
reported). 
152. Morgenbesser v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati di Genova, Case C-
313/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-13,467, ¶ 72 (holding that Community law precludes a Member 
State from refusing to allow the holder of a legal diploma obtained in another Member 
State to seek admission to the bar solely because the refusing Member State does not 
recognize that legal diploma as an equivalent to one obtained within that Member 
State). 
153. Vlassopoulou v. Ministerium für Justiz, Case C-340/89, [1991] E.C.R. I-2357 ¶ 
19 (holding that a Member State must review qualifications of foreign-certified 
applicants to practice law when law diploma requirements of the two states correspond 
only partially). 
154. See Morgenbesser, [2003] E.C.R. 13,467. The leading cases of the free 
movement of lawyers all deal with individuals who were already fully qualified lawyers. 
See, e.g., Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, Case 
C-55/94, [1995] E.C.R. I-4165 (German lawyer in Italy); Vlassopoulou, [1991] E.C.R. 2537 
(Greek lawyer in Germany); Thieffry v. Conseil de l’Ordre des Avocats à la Cour de 
Paris, Case C-71/76, [1977] E.C.R. 765 (Belgian lawyer in France). 
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trade.155 In other words, it assumes that the migrant wishes to 
become a professional in, and of, the host state, thus causing no 
disruption to the host regime’s regulation of those professions, 
other than by the addition of largely foreign-trained participants 
to the local market. However, Morgenbesser breaks with this 
regime by granting migrants, who have not completed their 
training, a right to be assessed by the competent authority to 
discover whether they can join the host state’s training regime.156 
There are several further complications caused by this ruling. 
The competent authority will vary according to the national 
or sub-national regimes that are applicable. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, the professional bodies (law societies and 
bars) initially grant access to the professions,157 then, in the post-
academic stage of training, the professional schools regulate 
their own intake. In England and Wales, an applicant to the 
professional schools must first be registered with the Law Society 
as a student member and get confirmation that the academic 
stage has been completed.158 Thus, in England and Wales, the 
Law Society will receive solicitors’ Morgenbesser applications. 
Though applicants to the Legal Practice Course (“LPC”) or Bar 
Vocational Course (“BVC”) may not have the status of self-
employed persons or workers, but rather will be considered as 
students, their rights of access to cross border training are now 
also fully recognized in EU law.159 
In Germany, after the first state examination (given to 
students who have first completed university studies) candidates 
seek to fulfill the Referendarzeit (traineeship stage) and must 
apply to the Lander judicial administration for placements.160 The 
trainees at this stage 
 
155. Professional Qualifications Recognition Directive, supra note 52, 2005 O.J. L 
255. 
156. See Morgenbesser, [2003] E.C.R. 13,467. 
157. Solicitors Regulation Authority, Information for Students and Trainees, 
http://sra.org.uk/students/students.page (last visited Oct. 1, 2010). 
158. Id. 
159. See Commission v. Austria, C-147/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-5969; Raulin v. Minister 
van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen, Case C-357/89, [1992] E.C.R. I-1027; Gravier v. City 
of Liège, Case 293/83, [1985] E.C.R. 593; see also Julian Lonbay, The European Higher 
Education Area: Two Steps Closer, 2 EUR. J. LEGAL EDUC. 75, 75 (2005). 
160. See ISTITUTO DI RICERA SUI SISTEMI GIUDIZIARI CONSIGLIO NAZIONALE DELLE 
RICERCHE, RECRUITMENT, PROFESSIONAL EVALUATION AND CAREER OF JUDGES AND 
  
1658 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1629 
are employed by the State (the judicial administration) as or 
similar to civil servants in training and are paid a small 
monthly allowance while in preparatory service. They have to 
spend a few months each in a court for civil law suits, in a 
criminal court or a prosecutor’s office, in a local or 
government administration, with a practising lawyer 
(barrister/solicitor) and at other places of their choice.161 
Morgenbesser candidates would, then apply in Germany, to 
the state authorities, as in the Peśla case. In the Netherlands, the 
district courts admit would-be lawyers to the bar,162 as long as the 
Council of Supervision (of the Bar) has not opposed the 
application163 of the candidate within six weeks of receiving a 
copy of the application; candidates here apply to a court. 
In each of these cases the body dealing with the application 
often has no guidance from national law on how to deal with the 
application,164 as the relevant provisions are determined by the 
pre-existing national routes that grant access to the profession. 
However, by virtue of the Morgenbesser case, they must not only 
consider the new applicants (about whom national law might be 
silent) and make an assessment of their readiness to participate 
in the traineeship stage, but they must also assess all their 
qualifications and professional experience without resorting to 
academic homologation of their law or other professional 
 
PROSECUTORS IN EUROPE: AUSTRIA, FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS AND 
SPAIN 74 (2005). 
161. Id. 
162. See Wet van 23 juni 1952 (Stb. 365), met betrekking tot de oprichting van de 
Orde van Advocaten Nederland met inbegrip van regels met betrekking tot de bestelling 
en disciplinaire maatregelen van toepassing zijn op advocaten (Wet op de advocaten), 
met de laatste wijzigingen dateren 13 juli 2002 (Stb. 440 ), inwerkingtreding op 4 
september 2002 [Dutch Act on Advocates], art. 2, Staatsblad [Official Reporter] 440 
(2002)(“Anyone who has earned a post-graduate law degree or has the right to carry the 
title of meester from a university or the Open University to which the Higher Education 
and Research Act applies, provided that this degree or this right was conferred on him 
after passing passed the exam in private law, including civil procedural law, criminal law 
including criminal procedural law, and one of the following three subjects: 
constitutional law, administrative law including administrative procedure, or tax law, 
may apply in writing to the president of the district court to be admitted to the Bar.”). 
163. See id. art. 4. 
164. See discussion supra note 151. However, it must be noted that Germany’s Law 
on Judges, which governs these matters, has been amended and does provide guidance. 
See Peśla v. Justizministerium Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Case C-345/08, (ECJ Dec. 10, 
2009) (not yet reported). 
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degree.165 It is clear from Court rulings that prior academic 
equivalence of qualifications cannot be demanded.166 As the 
Morgenbesser case confirmed,167 what is to be assessed are the 
candidate’s “professional” qualities compared to what is required 
to join the local legal profession.168 The competent authority can 
take into account the requirements of the local profession.169 
Thus courts, bars, law societies, and judicial administrations 
across Europe are thrown a task for which many are ill-equipped 
and ill-prepared. A new access route has been forced through the 
carefully crafted national training regimes, which typically 
provided set routes for access to the legal profession.170 The host 
state competent authority, however, can seek to maintain the 
nationally required standard of entry to their professions.171 
This new European alternative route is likely to have a 
destabilizing and fragmenting effect on existing national training 
regimes.172 It also reinforces the search for discovery of the 
common elements in legal education and training across Europe, 
primarily through developments that have occurred totally 
outside the ordinary EU method of decision-making, though the 
latest consolidating Directive, Directive 2005/36/EC on mutual 
recognition of professional qualifications, allows for specific 
developments in this regard by allowing for the creation of 
“common platforms.”173 The result of this “negative” integration 
 
165. The Morgenbesser principle could apply to mixed law degrees, such as 
Denmark’s Law and Business degree. 
166. See, e.g., Fernández de Bobadilla v. Museo Nacional del Prado, Case C-234/97, 
[1999] E.C.R. I-4773. 
167. Morgenbesser v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati di Genova, Case C-
313/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-13,467, ¶¶ 57–58, 63–66. 
168. Peśla, Case C-345/08, ¶ 44 (ECJ Dec. 10, 2009) (not yet reported). 
169. See Colegio Oficial de Agentes de la Propriedad Inmobiliaria v. Aguirre 
Borrell, Case C-104/91, [1992] E.C.R. 3003. 
170. See generally, ELIXIR, supra note 41 (providing links to training programs of 
fifteen countries). 
171. Consiglio Nazionale degli Ingegneri v. Ministero della Giustizia, Case C-
311/06, [2009] E.C.R. 415. 
172. The Law Society Training Framework Review in England and Wales, for 
example, has in part been propelled by the Morgenbesser case. See generally Andrew Boon 
et al., Postmodern Professions? The Fragmentation of Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 
22 J.L. & SOC’Y 473 (2005). 
173. Professional Qualifications Recognition Directive, supra note 52, 2005 O.J. L 
255. The directive allows professions at the European level to create “a common 
platform.” In the case of lawyers, professions at the European level are represented by 
the CCBE, which could define the attributes that lawyers should have. If the CCBE 
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is to promote the role of sub-state actors. Unlike the field of free 
movement of goods, where the possibility of harmonization of 
national rules is provided for expressly in the Treaty in order to 
reduce justifiable national barriers to free movement174 in 
relation to the free movement of persons, article 47 EC (article 
53 TFEU) poses a serious procedural barrier because unanimity 
in the Council is required when any harmonized rules would 
affect state regulations. Moreover, harmonization of the content 
of education and training itself is explicitly ruled out by the 
TFEU.175 
The Morgenbesser case is groundbreaking in other respects 
too. Article 39 EC (now article 45 TFEU), and article 43 EC (now 
article 49 TFEU) are applied as the prime legal basis for the 
decision. While article 45 TFEU (previously article 39 EC) has 
been used to benefit those not actually formally in work (at least 
under national law),176 article 49 TFEU (previously article 43 EC) 
has not been applied in respect of trainees before. This is less 
dramatic now that EU citizens can claim rights on article 21 
TFEU (previously article 18 EC), discussed below.177 Article 45 
TFEU is only applicable if the person provides “economic 
activity,” and trainees do not always satisfy this criterion (e.g., 
when following practical training courses such as the Legal 
Practice course in England and Wales). However, in Lawrie-
Blum178 trainees were paid, and in Morgenbesser the Court pointed 
 
reached agreement on a common platform, it could serve as a passport to practice law in 
other EU States, for those attaining it, if the European Commission adopts the common 
platform. There would then be no aptitude testing or adaptation periods. See id. 
174. Harmonization is also encouraged in some aspects through case law. See Rewe-
Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), Case C-
120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649; see also Commission Communication, 1980 O.J. C 256 
(concerning the consequences of the judgment given by the Court of Justice on 
February 20, 1979 in Case 120/78 (Cassis de Dijon)). 
175. EC Treaty, supra note 43, arts. 149, 150, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 61; TFEU, supra 
note 43, arts. 165–66, 2008 O.J. C 155, at 69; see Lonbay, supra note 55, at 243. 
176. See Raulin v. Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen, Case C-357/89, 
[1992] E.C.R. I-1027; The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Gustaff 
Desiderius Antonissen, Case C-292/89 [1991] E.C.R. I-745; Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-
Württemberg, Case 66/85 [1986] E.C.R. 2121. 
177. Added by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, EC Treaty article 18 provides for 
the free movement and residence rights of all citizens, not just workers, who derive these 
rights from article 39. EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 18, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 17; TFEU, 
supra note 43, art. 21, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 57. 
178. Lawrie-Blum, [1986] E.C.R. 2121, ¶¶ 19–21; see also Bernini v. Minister van 
Onderwijs en Wetenschappen, Case 3/90 [1992] E.C.R. I-1071, ¶¶ 14–17. 
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out that praticanti (Italian trainee lawyers) in Italy can have 
clients of their own. As long as “real and effective” work is carried 
out, article 49 TFEU applies. 
Admission as a trainee lawyer will, in some jurisdictions, 
enable partial practice rights.179 Thus migrants who might have 
little or even no formal training in host state law would be 
permitted to practice (though subject to the general rule of not 
practicing what they are not competent to do). It is submitted 
that in these cases the regulatory authorities might, if necessary, 
avail themselves of the “general interest” concerns to protect 
consumers and the fair administration of justice in order to 
ensure that migrant trainees practice only in matters where they 
are competent. 
Most states have centralized or partially centralized the 
processing of applications under Directive 98/5/EC and 
Directive 2005/36/EC. However the Court in Morgenbesser 
assigned the admissions role to the bar or the competent 
authority that leads students to the relevant course or training 
that, if successfully completed, gives the trainee lawyer status; it is 
quite possible that at this lower level of competence, there could 
be conflicting decisions by local competent authorities. This 
again has the effect of increasing the demand for centralized 
guidance.180 Article 53 TFEU (previously article 47 EC) deals with 
access to the profession (not training for the profession), and the 
Court in Morgenbesser established that traineeship as such is not a 
profession for the purposes of Directive 89/48/EEC.181 Article 5 
of Directive 89/48/EEC specifically avoided imposing the 
obligation on host state competent authorities having to accept 
migrants who had not completed their traineeships. Thus the 
Court has clearly, of its own initiative, moved the agenda forward. 
IV. MORGENBESSER ACCESS FOR HOST STATE NATIONALS 
It is clear from general EU law that EU citizens have rights 
of mobility that allows them access to host state territories for the 
 
179. For example in Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands. 
180. The CCBE in fact gave such guidance in 2004. See Morgenbesser Report, supra 
note 139, at III B. 
181. Morgenbesser v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati di Genova, Case C-
313/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-13,467, ¶¶ 54–55. 
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purposes of further study or training.182 If the bars and law 
societies of the EU Member States must admit migrant trainees 
on the basis of article 45 TFEU (previously article 39 EC) or 
article 49 TFEU (previously article 43 EC) then those receiving 
training are entitled to the equal treatment rule in article 18 
TFEU (previously article 12 EC).183 However, the rule requires 
like treatment for equivalent (not identical) situations. As bars 
and law societies normally require specified national degrees 
before access to such training, their obligation seems to be 
limited to an assessment of equivalence. Those with missing 
elements must fill any lacunae discovered However, the host state 
must, if it requires an aptitude test after such an assessment, set a 
flexible examination.184 
Another issue raised by the Morgenbesser case is whether or 
not the new Morgenbesser route should be open to nationals of a 
host Member State. It is clear from Morgenbesser that non-
nationals who are EU citizens migrating from another Member 
State can claim Morgenbesser rights to be considered for access to 
a profession’s training regime. 
 
182. See Raulin v. Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen, Case C-357/89, 
[1992] E.C.R. I-1027, ¶ 40; see also Council Directive No. 93/96/EC, 1993 O.J. L 317/59, 
repealed and replaced by Council and Parliament Directive No. 2004/58/EC on the right 
of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States, 2004 O.J. L 229/35, art. 7. The Court in the past has 
considered that migrants not in “genuine or effective” activity were outside the scope of 
the notion of a worker. See, e.g., Bettray v. Staatsecretaris van Justitie, Case 344/87, 
[1989] E.C.R. 1621, ¶ 20 (a drug addict in a rehabilitation program); Brown v. Sec’y of 
State of Scotland, Case 197/86, [1988] E.C.R. 3205, ¶¶ 12–13 (a university student in a 
sandwich course); Lawrie-Blum, [1986] E.C.R. 2121, ¶ 29 (a teacher in training was 
considered a worker). The receiving of education, which was not considered a “service” 
in Belgium v. Humbel, would allow residence rights, but not access to general welfare 
benefits. Case 263/86, [1988] E.C.R. 5365, ¶ 20. The situation is now not so clear cut. 
See Bidar v. London Borough of Ealing, Case C-209/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-2119, ¶¶ 48, 
56–58; Morgan v. Köln, Joined Cases C-11 & C-12/06, [2007] E.C.R. 9161, at 51; Förster 
v. Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep, Case C-158/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-8507, 
¶ 60; Opinion of Avocate General Sharpston, Bressol v. Gouvernement de la 
Communauté Française, Case C-73/08, ¶¶ 91–92 (ECJ June 25, 2009) (not yet 
reported). 
183. TFEU, supra note 43, art. 18, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 26; EC Treaty, supra note 43, 
art. 12, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 48. 
184. See Peśla v. Justizministerium Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Case C-345/08, ¶ 59 
(ECJ Dec. 10, 2009) (not yet reported). 
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Equally it seems that nationals of a Member State who have 
studied185 or gained relevant experience abroad could return to 
their own Member States to seek entry to the profession using 
the Morgenbesser route to request assessment. This follows from 
the Court’s case law, which requires a link to EU law, traditionally 
shown by cross-border economic activity. As the Court indicated 
in Broekmeulen v. Huisarts Registratie Commissie: 
Those freedoms [free movement of persons, the right of 
establishment, and the freedom to provide services], which 
are fundamental to the system set up by the Community, 
would not be fully realized if Member States were able to 
deny the benefit of provisions of Community law to those of 
their nationals who have availed themselves of the freedom of 
movement and the right of establishment and who have 
attained, by those means, the professional qualifications 
mentioned in the directive in a Member State other than the 
State whose nationality they hold.186 
In Knoors v. Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken, the Court 
indicated: 
 Although it is true that the provisions of the treaty relating 
to establishment and the provision of services cannot be 
applied to situations which are purely internal to a Member 
State, the position nevertheless remains that the reference in 
article 52 [now Article 43] to “nationals of a Member State” 
who wish to establish themselves “in the territory of another 
Member State” cannot be interpreted in such a way as to 
exclude from the benefit of Community law a given Member 
State’s own nationals when the latter, owing to the fact that they 
have lawfully resided on the territory of another Member State and 
have there acquired a trade qualification which is recognized by the 
provisions of Community law, are, with regard to their State of 
origin, in a situation which may be assimilated to that of any 
other persons enjoying the rights and liberties guaranteed by 
the treaty.187 
 
185. See Kraus v. Land Baden-Württemberg, Case C-19/92, [1993] E.C.R. I-1663, ¶¶ 
18–23, 32. 
186. Broekmeulen v. Huisarts Registratie Commissie, Case 246/80, [1981] E.C.R. 
2311, ¶ 20 (emphasis added). 
187. Knoors v. Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken, Case 115/78, [1979] E.C.R. 
399, ¶ 24 (emphasis added). 
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Traditionally, in EU law, individuals in situations that are 
“wholly internal” to a single Member State (i.e., involving no 
cross-border element) cannot invoke EU law.188 The potential 
“reverse discrimination” (i.e., allowing non-mobile home state 
nationals to be treated less favorably than non-national EU 
citizens or home state nationals who have exercised their right to 
free movement) was accepted and justified on the theory that EU 
law should not interfere with purely national matters.189 It was up 
to Member States to correct such imbalances should they choose 
to do so.190 In Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Uecker, the Court considered 
that the fact that a claimant of rights had EU citizenship would 
not as such affect the scope of the treaty, thus leaving internal 
situations to be dealt with by national law.191 However, this rule 
permitting reverse discrimination is in the process of being 
reduced in extent by the advancement of various rights now 
accruing to European citizens since that concept was introduced 
in the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty). In D’Hoop 
v. Office national de l’emploi, the Court ruled that EU law 
precluded a Member State from refusing to grant the tide-over 
allowance (a financial subsidy intended to cover living expenses) 
to one of its nationals, a student seeking her first employment, 
on the sole ground that that student had completed her 
secondary education in another Member State.192 The Court 
wrote: 
 In that a citizen of the Union must be granted in all Member 
States the same treatment in law as that accorded to the 
nationals of those Member States who find themselves in the 
same situation, it would be incompatible with the right of 
freedom of movement were a citizen, in the Member State of 
which he is a national, to receive treatment less favourable 
 
188. See generally Steen v. Deutsche Bundespost, C-332/90, [1992] E.C.R. I-341; 
Stephen Kon, Aspects of Reverse Discrimination in Community Law, 6 EUR. L. REV. 75 
(1981); David Pickup, Reverse Discrimination and Freedom of Movement for Workers, 23 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 135 (1986). 
189. See generally Niam Shuibhne, Free Movement of Persons and the Wholly Internal 
Rule: Time to Move On?, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 731 (2002); Tryfonidou, supra note 
134. 
190. See Shuibhne, supra note 189, at 732. 
191. Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Uecker, Joined Cases C-64–65/96, E.C.R. [1997] I-
3171. 
192. D’Hoop v. Office national de l’emploi, Case 224/98, [2002] E.C.R. I-6191, ¶ 
34. 
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than he would enjoy if he had not availed himself of the 
opportunities offered by the Treaty in relation to freedom of 
movement.193 
The case involved a form of cross-border movement (a Belgian 
national’s receipt of secondary education in France), but the 
phrase “in all Member States” in the paragraph above indicated 
the line of thinking of these cases.194 It is still currently linked to 
free movement: “Such inequality of treatment is contrary to the 
principles which underpin the status of citizen of the Union, that 
is, the guarantee of the same treatment in law in the exercise of the 
citizen’s freedom to move.”195 
Some authors consider that the reverse discrimination rule 
is dead.196 However, there are as yet no definitive cases. European 
bars and law societies should consider preparing for the situation 
whereby their own nationals, with no European studies or 
experience, seek access to the Morgenbesser route as European 
citizens seeking equal treatment as such. Currently, in my view, 
nationals who have relevant studies or experience in another 
Member State could already have a legitimate claim to use the 
Morgenbesser route. The only state defense against such use is the 
doctrine of abuse of rights, but this has been whittled down.197 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has outlined a series of events and legal 
developments opening access to the legal professions in Europe 
and raising ethical questions about regulatory control over the 
competence of members of the legal professions.198 One result 
 
193. Id. ¶ 30 (emphasis added). 
194. Id. 
195. Id. ¶ 35 (emphasis added). 
196. E.g., Vassilis Hatzopoulos, A (More) Social Europe: A Political Crossroad or a Legal 
One-Way? Dialogues between Luxembourg and Lisbon, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1599, 1607 
(2005) (arguing that it stems from case law that, at least as far as “personal freedoms” 
(i.e., free movement of persons and services) are concerned, European citizenship now 
prohibits reverse discrimination). 
197. See Zhu and Chen v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dept., Case C-200/02, [2004] 
E.C.R. I-9925, ¶ 36. Generally, the motive for the person’s movement is irrelevant. See, 
e.g., Ninni-Orasche v. Bundesminister für Wissenschaft, Case C-413/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-
13,187. 
198. Parliament and Council Directive 2006/123/EC now basically mandates home 
state control of cross-border services with many provisos and exceptions. See Council 
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has been increased pressure within the CCBE to develop and 
recognize commonalities in legal training across Europe. The 
European Law Faculty Association (“ELFA”) has also sought to 
find commonality in legal education.199 There is great pressure 
for professions and their regulators to try to find commonality in 
terms of training requirements. In discussions on this topic they 
used to say, for example, “We had to do so many hours training 
in this and that in order to become a lawyer, therefore we could 
not possibly accept somebody who has done less training on 
these topics.” The application of Morgenbesser indicates that there 
has to be a lot more transparency about access to a bar or law 
society. The move to measuring training in terms of outcomes 
has helped to secure a certain level of agreement. The CCBE has 
started that work by producing a training document, the 
Recommendation on Training Outcomes for European Lawyers, 
which strongly emphasizes the ethical component of legal 
training.200 That the CCBE could actually agree on training 
outcomes at the European level, even though in a non-binding 
instrument, is a considerable achievement. A parallel ELFA 
process sought to determine a common set of outcomes of law 
degrees at the university level.201 All these developments have 
significant implications for lawyers and how their competence to 
practice in EU Member States is assessed and controlled. 
One should also look at the experience of some of the 
smaller jurisdictions when working on commonalties in legal 
education. Luxembourg had no law school of its own until very 
recently. It happily accepted graduates in law from Germany, 
France, and Belgium, who then had to supplement their studies 
with some courses on Luxembourg law before entering the 
professional stage of training. Similarly, Cyprus still accepts law 
degrees from many European states as an acceptable basis for 
entering its largely common law practice, as it had no native law 
 
Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market, 2006 O.J. L 376/36. More 
detailed treatment of this directive is outside the scope of this Article. 
199. See, e.g., Richard Parnham, Searching for a True European Lawyer, 27 EUR. LAW. 
31 (2003); see also JULIAN LONBAY ET AL., EUROPEAN LAW FACULTY ASS’N TUNING LEGAL 
STUDIES IN EUROPE: INITIAL FINDINGS (2008), available at http:// ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1677820. 
200. CCBE, supra note 30. 
201. See LONBAY, supra note 199. 
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school training provider.202 This experience suggests that precise 
knowledge of a very wide range of national law before entry is not 
necessary, depending on what area one intends to practice. This 
suggests that the large national legal educational regimes are not, 
strictly speaking, necessary for the effective practice of law. What 
is needed is the ability to find, understand, and apply the law 
relevant in a particular case.203 This would indeed mean learning 
the key concepts applicable in a given legal system. The 
implication here is that some core competencies could indeed be 
learned and then applied to particular aspects of law in particular 
cases. The European Lawyers’ Establishment Directive came to a 
similar conclusion some time ago, though of course it only 
provides practice rights to lawyers already fully trained in the law 
of another jurisdiction. 
Many consider that the legal professions, as such, are not 
entitled to the large monopolies of legal practice that they 
currently enjoy in many states in Europe. This consideration is 
behind the EU competition law campaign204 to promote the de-
monopolization of many legal services. The professions tend to 
emphasize their role in protecting citizens’ rights and the rule of 
law in the face of such “threats.” The legal professions can 
justifiably point to the essential public service role that they 
perform in the protection of democracy, the promotion of the 
rule of law, and the sound administration of justice. 
As has been shown, national entry routes that set out and 
enforce precisely defined national legal knowledge and skills are 
undermined by the developing internal market law of the EU. 
Given the fragmentation and divergent nature of the profession 
in some countries and the already flexible nature of legal services 
provision in others, the effects of the intervention of EU internal 
market rules, combined with application of EU competition law, 
are likely to exaggerate the existing tendency toward divergence, 
 
202. See generally Kaniye Ebeku & Sofia Michaelidou-Mateou, Developing Legal 
Education in Europe: The Experience of the Republic of Cyprus, 4 EUR. J. LEGAL EDUC. 19 
(2007). 
203. See LONBAY, supra note 199, at 13–15. 
204. See OECD, COMPETITIVE RESTRICTIONS IN LEGAL PROFESSIONS (2007), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/38/40080343.pdf. Many also feel that in 
the United States, the legal advice monopoly is an unnecessary burden on the economy 
and that non-lawyers could happily supply specialist advice in particular sectors with 
little or no reduction in the quality of service to clients. 
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fragmentation, and competition, all leveled by general consumer 
protection rules. 
If there is to be an increasingly atomistic delivery of legal 
services in Europe, what effects will there be on training 
requirements? The issue of guaranteeing the competence of the 
individual lawyer in the future could, in part, be satisfied by 
accredited specialist groupings, protected titles, or even through 
a series of common Europe-wide platforms now permitted by the 
new mutual recognition of qualifications Directive 2005/36, as 
well as by initial training. The issue of specialist delivery of legal 
services by those who are not members of the legal profession will 
have to be faced, whether they are somehow accredited or not. 
The strategy of the “traditional” legal professions faced with this 
situation, if they wish to survive as such, is to be flexible in their 
entry routes and requirements and to develop or encourage the 
recognition of accredited (or not) specialist legal practice. They 
should, where possible, develop flexible assessment mechanisms 
to cope with entry at different stages of development, knowledge, 
and skills. Ideally they should move beyond establishing a set of 
common training outcomes and work on “common platforms” 
for some types of legal practice. Continuing legal training205 
would become a more normal pattern and could be used to 
promote high standards and to help ensure competence, 
particularly in fields of legal practice where specialization exists 
or is developing. 
The issues confronting the European legal professions and 
legal service providers outlined above indicate that change is on 
the way and must be handled with care. More work is necessary 
to define the core elements and legal skills and knowledge that 
are necessary for successful practice of law; the development of 
more understanding of how to successfully assess the 
preparedness for legal practice of candidates; the probable 
acceptance of an increasingly specialized legal services work 
force; and related sets of specialist titles that themselves may 
permit limited specialist practice rights across borders. The 
evolving European legal market will itself need servicing, and the 
development of effective modes of continuing professional 
training, easily achieved and recognized across borders, should 
 
205. See CCBE, supra note 30. 
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help in enabling cross-border practice and delivery of legal 
services. 
